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ABSTRACT
Rwanda has embarked on an ambitious policy package to
modernise and professionalise the agrarian and land sector. Its
reform ﬁts into a broader call – supported by major international
donors – to implement a Green Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa.
After 10 years of implementation, there is increased production
output and value-addition in commercialised commodity chains.
These are promising results. However, poverty reduction,
particularly in more recent years, seems limited. Moreover, micro-
level evidence from the ﬁeld calls into question the long-term
sustainability of the agricultural and land sector reform. In this
article, a group of researchers, having engaged in in-depth
qualitative research in a variety of settings and over an extended
period, bring together their main research results and combine
their key ﬁndings to challenge the dominant discourse on Rwanda
as a model for development.
La modernisation agricole et foncière au Rwanda :
confronter les résultats macro-économiques aux
réalités vécues sur le terrain
RÉSUMÉ
Le Rwanda a entamé une vaste réforme politique visant à moderniser
et à professionnaliser les secteurs agricole et foncier. Soutenu par des
bailleurs internationaux, ces réformes s’inscrivent dans une volonté
plus large d’introduire une Révolution Verte en Afrique
subsaharienne. Après une décennie de mise en œuvre au Rwanda,
on observe des résultats prometteurs tels que la croissance de la
production agricole et la création de valeur ajoutée dans les ﬁlières
agricoles commerciales. Néanmoins, la réduction de la pauvreté au
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cours de ces dernières années semble très limitée. De plus, des
observations relevées au niveau micro, en milieux ruraux,
questionnent la durabilité de ces réformes. Cet article regroupe les
résultats d’un groupe de chercheurs qui ont travaillé sur le Rwanda
avec une approche qualitative approfondie dans divers contextes
et sur une longue période. Leurs conclusions majeures
questionnent le discours dominant présenté par le Rwanda comme
un modèle de développement pour le continent africain.
Introduction
In recent years, states and donors have prioritised agricultural intensiﬁcation – framed
within a plea for a new Green Revolution – as a strategy for growth and development
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Jayne and Rashid 2013; Sanchez, Denning, and Nziguheba
2009). The theory behind such policies posits that formalisation of land tenure, investment
in modern inputs, and commercialisation will drive increased production of selected
marketable crops, which will be proﬁtable for smallholders if they are integrated into
commercial commodity chains. This, in turn, is expected to lead to increased national
food security, exports and growth on a national scale (Knickel et al. 2009). This is
crucial because in the face of population growth, there is limited availability of new
land to support agricultural expansion. Advocates of this new Green Revolution argue
that without modern inputs, soil fertility and food production are likely to decline
(Breisinger et al. 2011; Denning et al. 2009).
There are, however, a number of economic and structural constraints that stand in the way
of a Green Revolution in SSA. These include inequality in landholdings, gendered patterns of
access to inputs and other resources, limited public infrastructure in rural areas, and the dom-
ination ofmost economic sectors by politically connected elites (Nyenyezi Bisoka 2014). Such
constraints make the impact of contemporary Green Revolution policies on the lives of the
tens of millions of rural smallholders in SSA unclear (Dorward et al. 2004). Furthermore,
changes in tenure and farming practice can have far-reaching consequences for smallholders
(Dawson, Martin, and Sikor 2016). Studies from several countries in SSA have revealed con-
siderable negative impacts of the Green Revolution policy package for signiﬁcant sections of
the rural population, even where agricultural policies have been generally deemed successful
(Bezner Kerr 2013; Harrigan 2003; Abro, Alemu, andHanjra 2014; Kijima, Otsuka, and Sser-
unkuuma 2011; Wanjala and Muradian 2013). While indicators of agricultural commodity
production, export values, and the contribution of agriculture to national economic growth
may reveal positive macro-economic impacts, in-depth studies are required to understand
the pathways of change for the diverse populations aﬀected.
Rwanda is a very pertinent example to explore this debate. Some authors categorise
Rwanda as a development state (Harrison 2016), while others see it as an example of a
developmental patrimonial state, in which ‘the ruling elite acquires an interest in, and a
capability for, managing economic rents in a centralised way with a view to enhancing
their own and others’ incomes in the long run rather than maximising them in the
short run’ (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012, 381). The country has been hailed as a
‘developmental miracle’ (see Mann and Berry 2016 for a discussion on this debate), par-
ticularly due to high levels of economic growth (Matfess 2015).
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At the same time, Rwanda’s current economic base remains subsistence farming. More
than 70% of the population cultivate for the food they eat. Rwanda has the highest population
density on mainland Africa, high population growth rates, small average land holdings at
around 0.75 hectares per household and a high incidence of landlessness (McMillan and
Heady 2014; NISR 2010). TheRwandan government’s ambitious policy programme to inten-
sify and commercialise agriculture was aimed at turning Rwanda from subsistence farming
into a modern and developed country. It includes the formalisation of land tenure, the pro-
motion of intensiﬁed production of speciﬁed marketable crops through use of modern
inputs, and regional specialisation where regions concentrate on speciﬁc crop combinations
depending upon the agro-climate in that region (Republic of Rwanda 2004;MINAGRI 2011).
Since the introduction of policies to reshape the agrarian sector, Rwanda has – on the one
hand – enjoyed a period of consistently high economic growth (over 5% per annum since
2008) and a fall in income-based poverty (NISR 2012; UNDP 2007; IMF 2011). On the
other hand, citizens’ satisfaction with agrarian and land policies has decreased strongly,
even according to oﬃcial data of the RwandanGovernment. Between 2013 and 2016, satisfac-
tion with the quantity, quality and performances within the agrarian sector decreased from
57% to 48% and from 76% to 67% within the land sector (RGB 2014; RGB 2017).
Moreover, these macro-level, aggregate performance indicators only give a broad
understanding of Rwanda’s performance and do not necessarily reﬂect people’s lived
experiences. Several in-depth qualitative studies have revealed the neglected negative
impacts of rural policies on smallholders and local populations and the diverse ways in
which local households attempt to adapt (Ansoms et al. 2017; Ansoms and Cioﬀo 2016;
Nyenyezi Bisoka 2016; Ansoms and Murison 2013; Cioﬀo 2014; Van Damme 2013;
Huggins 2014a, 2017a, 2017b; Dawson 2015; Leegwater 2015; Treidl 2018).1 In this
paper, this group of researchers – who engaged in in-depth qualitative research in a
variety of Rwandan settings and over an extended period of time – combine their key
ﬁndings to challenge the dominant discourse on Rwanda as a model for development.
We ﬁrst comment on the strategic use of statistics by the Rwandan government to legit-
imise the successfulness of its Green Revolution-based agrarian development. We then
highlight the importance of qualitative in-depth research to gain a better understanding
of the impact of policies. We focus upon three key policy dimensions: land registration,
the Crop Intensiﬁcation Programme (CIP), and the promotion of cooperatives. Our
ﬁndings suggest how these policies lead to increased land-tenure and food insecurity, ten-
sions and the exclusion of vulnerable groups. We also dig into the role of key actors in the
implementation of agrarian modernisation. The ﬁndings show that there is limited space
for policy transgression and advocacy by civil society organisations because of the strong
top-down character of Rwanda’s governance system. In our conclusion, we question the
accuracy and dominance of quantitative indicators, and plead in favour of a more
nuanced, in-depth and multi-faceted research approach in order to understand the dis-
tance between centrally planned policies and local real life.
The power of statistics in the context of Rwanda
Although statistics are often presented as an unbiased representation of reality, several
authors have highlighted how the generation of statistics is part of a complex process
(Jerven 2013; Jerven and Johnston 2015; Sandefur and Glassman 2015). In practice, the
REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 3
data not only ‘describe realities, but they also shape them, since they are used to design or
support policies’ (Desiere, Staelens, and D’Haese 2016, 1). In Rwanda, statistics are viewed
as a major instrument in policy design, implementation and evaluation (Ansoms et al.
2017). Consequently, an important discussion revolves around the extent to which stat-
istics suﬃciently capture the impact and successfulness of Rwandan agricultural policies.
The Rwandan ‘success story’ emphasises the importance of ‘a clearly articulated devel-
opmental vision’ (Biedermann 2015, 15) on the basis of quantitative measures. Within the
administrative structures, the ‘speciﬁc targets and auditing procedures’ represented by
imihigo performance contracts are characteristic of the Rwandan governance model (Har-
rison 2016, 361).2 Indeed, performance-oriented strategies are embedded throughout the
entire administrative system, and fuel the government’s record of learning-by-doing
(Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012) and ‘trying new solutions’ (Biedermann 2015, 9)
based on ‘neutral scientiﬁc evidence’. However, those characterising Rwanda as engaged
in responsive policy-making, or ‘problem-driven iterative adaptation’ (for example
Booth 2015), do not consider how this learning process is marked by a strong top-
down governance system. ‘The National Dialogue in which implementation targets are
reviewed in public’ (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2014, S192) relies on the imihigo
system, which has been critiqued on the basis of its ‘top-down’ or coercive character
and hence cannot be said to reﬂect local development priorities (Bugingo and Interayama-
hanga 2010). Many poor citizens are ‘too frightened to voice their experiences to those in
power’ (Mann and Berry 2016, 137). Evidence which contradicts the government narrative
is ‘contained’ or ‘managed’ at diﬀerent levels of the government machinery, partly because
it is inserted into a hierarchy of knowledge (including ‘scepticism about local skills and
practices’ and assumptions that experts know best (Hasselskog 2015, 158) and partly
because the ongoing programming of government activities relies on ‘rough classiﬁcations
and fairly general knowledge’ (Hasselskog 2015, 163), intended to result in ‘standardised
solutions’ (Hasselskog 2015, 157) rather than diversiﬁed and adapted solutions based on
local-level data.
The extensive use of quantitative targets within Rwanda’s plans and policies should also
be seen within the context of broader global patterns of rendering development activities
‘calculable’ (Hoey 2015; Kelley and Simmons 2015).3 Detailed plans and targets are there-
fore not only used to guide policy, but also to demonstrate success and to consolidate
donor support for the government (for examples, see Ansoms and Rostagno 2012;
Ansoms et al. 2017; Burnet 2011, 311; Debusscher and Ansoms 2013, 1124). The ability
of the government to maintain its policy-making ‘autonomy’ is largely based on its
ability to deliver developmental improvements, and hence there is considerable incentive
for the government to emphasise successes.
Let us ﬁrst consider Rwanda’s agricultural statistics. Desiere, Staelens and D’Haese
(2016) have compared various data sources on agrarian outputs: yearly UN Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates, household surveys, and an agricultural
survey. Table 1 illustrates how the diﬀerent datasets may be interpreted in very
diﬀerent ways with regards to the increase in yields over the period of the implementation
of the agricultural reforms (between 10 and 60% increase). Beyond the point that yields are
not the only indicator with which to evaluate the performances of farming systems,
Desiere and his co-authors conclude that ‘it is not possible to make strong statements
about the success or failure of the reforms in increasing yields. The problem is not a
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lack of data availability – the [Government of Rwanda] undertook signiﬁcant and laudable
eﬀorts to make their datasets publicly available – but rather that diﬀerent data sources con-
tradict each other and there is no way of telling which dataset is more reliable’ (Desiere,
Staelens, and D’Haese 2016, 10). The same authors also highlight how in oﬃcial dis-
courses, both the Rwandan government as well as international donors systematically
refer to the most optimistic data material (FAO statistics) whereas these data are the
least reliable. They conclude that ‘statistics may thus partially have created their own
“reality”’ (Desiere, Staelens, and D’Haese 2016, 10).
A second major debate revolves around the Rwandan poverty statistics. Rwanda has a
good track record in the generation of reliable poverty data. Since 2000/1, several House-
hold Living Conditions Surveys (EICV by their French acronym) have been conducted,
providing input to the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategies.
Whereas poverty reduction was limited over the 2000/01–2005/16 period, the results of
EICV3 indicated an impressive poverty decrease for the 2005/06–2010/11 period (NISR
2015a) (see Table 2). Ansoms et al. (2017, 51) reﬂect on how these results ‘were welcomed
as the much-needed scientiﬁc proof of a successful developmental path and a political
justiﬁcation to allocate aid while less attention was paid to criticism of Rwanda’s
limited space for political freedom’. They point out that methodological issues related
to sampling techniques, to the seasonal ﬂuctuation in agricultural outputs, and to the
pressure upon farmers to make statements that reﬂect government policy may well
Table 1. Overall yields (kg/ha) in Rwanda estimated with diﬀerent
data sources.
Yields (kg/ha)
Year FAO Household surveys Agricultural survey*
2006 1306 1140
2011 2029 1370
2013 2077 1478
*Only season B (March to end of July).
Source: Desiere, Staelens and D’Haese 2016.
Table 2. Growth–poverty–inequality statistics compared.
EICV1 2000/1
(1)
EICV2 2005/6
(2)
EICV3 2010/11
(2)
EICV4 2013/14
(3)
EICV4 2013/14
(4)
EICV4 2013/14
(5)
Oﬃcial
estimates
Inﬂation at
16.7%
Inﬂation
at 30%
Poor (%) 58.9 56.7 44.9 39.1 37.4 46.1
Extremely poor (%) 40.0 35.8 24.1 16.3 16.9 23.2
Gini 0.507 0.522 0.490 0.448
Notes:
(1) The percentage of poor is based on a poverty line of RWF64,000 (2001 prices). Extreme poverty is calculated on the basis
of a poverty line of RWF45,000 (2001 prices) (NISR 2012).
(2) For EICV2 and EICV3, ‘poverty was estimated using the poverty line derived from EICV1 after deﬂating the consumption
expenditure in both surveys’ (NISR 2015a).
(3) The methodology for calculating the 2013/14 poverty line diﬀers profoundly from the method used for EICV1, 2 and 3,
given the reconﬁguration of the entire food basket (NISR 2015a). As a result of the changed methodology, the poverty
percentage cannot legitimately be compared to past poverty rates.
(4) Poverty rates obtained by assuming that poverty is correctly estimated in EICV3 and inﬂating the corresponding (food)
poverty line by 16.7%, i.e. the inﬂation rate reported by the NISR from January 2011–January 2014 (Desiere 2017).
(5) Poverty rates obtained by assuming that poverty is correctly estimated in EICV3 and inﬂating the corresponding (food)
poverty line with 30% (Desiere 2017).
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have inﬂuenced the poverty statistics (Ansoms et al. 2017). Particularly, the fact that 2010/
11 was a good agricultural season whereas 2005/06 was not, deserved more attention in the
interpretation of the ‘success story’ (McKay and Verpoorten 2016). Ansoms et al. (2017)
also point to the risk of the statistical success story of Rwanda ‘turn[ing] a blind eye to life
experiences regarding public policies’.
The release of the 2013/14 EICV4 continued along the same lines with an apparent
poverty reduction ﬁgure of almost six percentage points (from 44.9% in 2010/11 to
39.1% in 2013/14– see Table 2) (NISR 2015a).However, therewas controversy on themeth-
odology used for recalculating the 2013/14 poverty line – and thus, on the comparability of
the data between EICV3 (2010/11) and EICV4 (2013/14). The subsequent debate revealed
the necessity of a new analysis using the same poverty criteria in both periods. For this
purpose, the 2016 NISR ‘Poverty Trend Analysis Report 2010/11–2013/14’ used two
diﬀerent methodologies and concluded that – regardless of the methodology used –
poverty decreased by between 6.9 and 7.8 percentage points. However, as the results were
sensitive to the inﬂation rate used to deﬂate the poverty line between both periods, the
debate continued around the validity of the inﬂation rate of 16.7% – as reported by the
National Institute of Statistics for the 2010/11–2013/14 period (NISR 2016).
Desiere has cross-referenced the price information included in the EICV surveys with
the ESOKO surveys and conﬁrms that trends in poverty rates are highly dependent upon
the inﬂation rate. When applying an inﬂation rate of 16.7% (as done in the oﬃcial
Rwandan government’s analysis), his calculations indicate a poverty decrease of 7.5 per-
centage points for the 2010/11–2013/14 period – results that are in line with the 2016
NISR report. However, with a more realistic inﬂation rate of 30%, poverty increased by
1.2 percentage points (Desiere 2017). Anonymous authors (2017) engaged in a similar
analysis but based the applicable inﬂation rate on a Laspeyres price index diﬀerentiated
by consumption quarter and province calculated on the basis of EICV price data. They
come to a poverty increase of between 5% and 7% for the 2010/11–2013/14 period, depen-
dent upon the consumption basket used (Anonymous 2017). Also the World Develop-
ment Indicators4 indicate a poverty increase from 60.25% households below the
international poverty line of US$1.90 (purchasing power parity) in 2010, to 60.43% in
2013.
On the basis of these analyses of statistical data, we may conclude that (1) yields prob-
ably increased over the period of the implementation of the agricultural reforms, but less
than what the most optimistic but least reliable data source (FAO statistics) suggests; (2)
poverty decreased signiﬁcantly over the 2005/06–2010/11 period but with seasonal eﬀects
playing a partial role; (3) inﬂation over the 2010/11–2013/14 period was probably much
higher (around 30%) than the assumed 16.7%; and (4) under this assumption, poverty
did not decrease signiﬁcantly over that period, but rather increased.
Digging deeper: the importance of qualitative in-depth research
Both Rwandan and international policy circles have a preference for quantitative evidence-
based input, preferably based on conclusions drawn from nationally representative data-
sets. However, the generation of large-scale datasets is subject to very strict government
control, with researchers being obliged to follow stringent procedures in order to obtain
the formal permission to engage in research generating nationally representative data.
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There are severe punishments for researchers not respecting these procedures (NISR
2015b). This complicates the generation of statistical knowledge independent from gov-
ernment inﬂuence.
Formal procedures for research approval are less strict for researchers engaging in quali-
tative in-depth research. However, the value of such research is often considered to be of
lesser relevance to policy-making. When contesting the broader picture of the success
story, in-depth research is regularly downgraded as the story of one or a couple of hills.5
And indeed, the purpose of qualitative research is not to sketch out a representative
picture for the entire Rwandan territory, but to understand the ways in which processes
work, how diﬀerent actors relate to each other, and how they develop implicit and explicit
discourses and strategies. Each of the authors in this paper (except for Desiere) has done in-
depth research on the impact of Rwanda’s rural modernisation policies. This is set out by
author and district in Table 3, and a map of Rwanda at Figure 1 shows these districts.
The exact methodologies, focus and timings of these studies were diﬀerent. In general,
all authors, except for Desiere who concentrated on the statistics, used qualitative methods
(semi-structured focus groups and/or individual interviews, participant observation),
while Cioﬀo, Dawson and Van Damme also collected quantitative data on several agricul-
tural aspects. Each study focused largely on the perspective of rural Rwandans themselves
and applied considerable attention to gaining the trust of participants to ensure data
reliability. This involved emphasising the lack of political aﬃliation and conﬁdentiality
of data. A good claim to the validity of the results is that, despite the lack of incentive
among participants to criticise state policy, the consistency of results between the
studies in diﬀerent parts of Rwanda is striking.
Each of the authors wants to emphasise that the raw data are not comparable, nor
representative for the whole territory of Rwanda. However, when combined, these
studies cover a broad variety of settings and regions, reaching a geographical scale that
goes beyond ‘a couple of hills’, and despite the diﬀerence in analytical focus, each of
Table 3. Overview of research settings and topics for each author.
Author Districts of research
Years of
research Research topics
Ansoms Huye/Kamonyi/Muhanga
Nyamagabe/Nyaruguru
Ruhango
2006–07, 2011,
2013
Livelihood strategies and impact of agricultural
policies
Rwanda overall 2015–17 Role of intermediary actors in rural development
policies (with Nyenyezi Bisoka)
Cioﬀo Huye, Nyamagabe,
Nyamasheke, Nyaraguru,
Musanze
2012–15 Impact of Crop Intensiﬁcation Programme (CIP) on
local livelihoods and food security
Dawson Nyamasheke/Nyamagabe
Rutsiro
2011–12 (Perceived main drivers of change in) well-being and
priorities of the population
Huggins Kirehe/Musanze 2005–07, 2008,
2011–13
Land rights, agricultural reforms (especially CIP and
cooperatives)
Leegwater Ngoma 2008–10 Land-sharing arrangements
Murison Kamonyi/Muhanga/
Nyamagabe/ Ruhango/Kirehe
2010, 2011 Livelihood strategies and impact of agricultural
policies
Nyenyezi
Bisoka
Huye/Nyamagabe
Nyamasheke/Nyaruguru/
Rusizi
2012–17 Role of rural policies in the legitimation of land
grabbing processes and peasant resistance to land
grabbing
Treidl Gasabo 2014–16 Agricultural everyday life
Van Damme Bugesera/Huye/Kirehe/Rusizi 2008–12 Innovation in farmer-based cropping systems with a
focus on bananas
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these studies comes to a critical perspective on the impact of recent agrarian and land
reforms at the local level, with common themes emerging from these geographically
and methodologically diverse qualitative studies.
Rwanda as a model for agricultural modernisation?
The government has taken a highly interventionist stance in the agricultural sector (as with
the economy more generally). The agrarian and land sector modernisation, based originally
on the 2005 Organic Land Law, has pushed farmers into obligatory formal land registration.
Ensuring secure land rights through a formal land registration system is seen as a crucial step
in enhancing investment in the agricultural sector. It also allows the government to have a
clear view on and control over land rights (see ‘Land registration and land-sharing arrange-
ments’ section below). The CIP – implemented from 2007 onwards – aims to transform
Rwanda’s family farming into a professionalised sector, and is oriented towards the sale
of target crops rather than home consumption (see ‘The Crop Intensiﬁcation Policy’
section). Cooperatives are key structures in the organisation of this new agrarian model.
Not only do they allow for a more coordinated agrarian approach, they are also instruments
in a top-down state-controlled governance model (see ‘Cooperatives’ section).
Land registration and land-sharing arrangements
The government of Rwanda assumed that by implementing oﬃcial registration and titling,
land-tenure security would be enhanced. Rural farmland owners can obtain a lease of up to
Figure 1. Map of Rwanda showing the districts covered by the authors’ research. Source: The authors.
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99 years. The new land administration is based on a reformed cadastre system that facili-
tates taxation (GoR 2004, 25–30). However, the 99-year lease made many farmers fear that
their land rights would not be secure (Huggins 2014a, 2). In addition, most farmers felt
that tenure security is not so much about documented property rights (i.e. provision of
leases or deeds) but about security from land disputes within families, or with neighbours
or state authorities (Musahara and Huggins 2005, 319; Van Hoyweghen 1999, 368). Since
the land registration began, several studies have shown that many farmers felt reluctant to
participate in the registration process and to inform authorities about the sizes of their
plots (Ansoms 2011a; RISD 2012, 2013). In 2013, only 45% of respondents countrywide
had collected their ﬁnal land certiﬁcate because of the titling fees (RWF1000, or about
US$1.20 per plot), taxation and ‘an overall lack of incentive to own a title’ (RISD 2013,
10, 15).
In many areas in Rwanda, land registration also led to an increase in land conﬂicts
(Ansoms 2011a), especially in areas where the authorities had previously engaged in
land right reshuﬄing in response to refugee return, as was the case, for example, in
Ngoma District in Southeast Rwanda. In Ngoma, a land-sharing arrangement was
implemented in 1996–1997. At that time, most refugees, who were returning to
Rwanda after having been in exile since 1994, found their homes and ﬁelds occupied.
The people occupying their land were refugees who had been in exile since the late
1950s/early 1960s, and who had returned to Rwanda in 1994. The later-returning group
of refugees, mainly Hutu, were supposed to share their land with the early group of refu-
gees, who were mainly Tutsi, and every family was to obtain one hectare. Land sharing was
not supported by legislation or a decree. Nonetheless, most people regarded it as compul-
sory, even though the population had been consulted and sensitised. Furthermore, it was
implemented in a climate of mutual fear and distrust between the two ethnic groups (Leeg-
water 2015). For years, their frustration simmered over the land they lost. Although the
land-sharing arrangement was never openly criticised, family conﬂicts and resentment
regarding land sharing were the main sources of (land) conﬂict in Ngoma District (Leeg-
water 2015, 205), and this resentment was known to local authorities (see also Republic of
Rwanda 2007). In 2010, this resentment came to the fore with the beginning of land regis-
tration in the area, and the collective realisation that registration would anchor the sharing
arrangement in a formal land registration system.
In present-day Rwanda, land conﬂicts are still widespread and often concern parcels
that are already oﬃcially registered (see also RISD 2013). At the same time, people
often do not report the transactions of oﬃcially registered land, particularly not in the
case of small land plots; which may generate new land conﬂicts. In addition, farmers
are worried about the ways in which a land register allows authorities to ‘govern’ land
rights. An updated register is a very eﬃcient tool for authorities to push farmers into cen-
trally organised modern farming systems; and to exclude those who resist from access to
land (Ansoms et al. 2017; Huggins 2014a, 2014b).
The Crop Intensiﬁcation Policy
Next to formal land registration, the Crop Intensiﬁcation Programme is central to the gov-
ernment’s agricultural reform (Cioﬀo, Ansoms and Murison 2016). Heavily inﬂuenced by
the ‘Green Revolution for Africa’ model (AGRA 2014) the programme focuses on four
REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 9
axes: (1) land use consolidation; (2) sale of fertilisers and improved seeds; (3) provision of
proximity extension services; and (4) improvement of post-harvesting handling and
storage (Cioﬀo, Ansoms and Murison 2016).
Customarily, farming households practised intercropping and cultivated several small
plots in diﬀerent parts of the landscape. Intercropping was a risk management strategy
(Van Damme, Ansoms, and Baret 2013). Research has shown that in Rwanda, small, inter-
cropped ﬁelds are often more productive than large, monocropped areas (Isaacs et al.
2016; Ansoms, Verdoodt, and Van Ranst 2009; Blarel, Hazell, and Place 1992).
However, under the land use consolidation approach, farmers cultivating ﬁelds adjacent
to each other are obliged to choose a single crop, and use a single cultivation regime
(incorporating choices of inputs, and schedules for planning, weeding, harvesting, and
other activities).6 Farmers cultivating under the CIP have to plant crops prioritised by
the government: originally six food crops (maize, wheat, cassava, beans, Irish potatoes,
and rice), though other crops, such as soya, have since been added to the list. Farmers
in tea- and coﬀee-growing areas are under similar government monitoring and extension
systems (Dawson, Martin, and Sikor 2016). Drought-resistant and low-input food security
crops, such as sorghum, and the multi-uses banana crop at the base of traditional farming
systems (Van Damme, Ansoms, and Baret 2013), are not included. The priority crops are
generally imposed at the administrative level of the sector, which has an average size of
approximately 64.5 square kilometres.7 Given the generally hilly topography (which pre-
sents various slopes, micro-climatic niches, soil conditions and hydrological character-
istics), and the fact that ‘Rwanda is ecologically diverse for its size’ (FEWSNET 2011,
4), a sector represents various agro-ecological conditions. Among other things, imposing
speciﬁc crops, or the type of one crop, at that scale does not adequately account for agro-
ecological diversity (Van Damme, Ansoms, and Baret 2013). Neither does it account for
the complexities of household-level food security and various socio-economic preferences
around gendered agricultural labour, food and nutrition (Cioﬀo, Ansoms, and Murison
2016; Treidl ﬁeld research notes 2015). Crops in the CIP were chosen following a
rather short pilot programme (Ansoms 2009) and very limited consultations (Huggins
2014a). The selection of maize as a priority crop for both dryland areas of Kirehe District
(Eastern Province) and mountainous areas of Rutsiro District (Western Province), despite
the frequent failure of maize crops due to drought, are examples of the associated negative
outcomes (Huggins 2017b; Dawson, Martin, and Sikor 2016).
Land use consolidation is, in theory, voluntary, but it has often been imposed on
farmers (Cioﬀo, Ansoms, and Murison 2016; University of Rwanda 2014; ARD 2008).
While oﬃcial criteria for selecting land for consolidation have not been published,
ﬁeldwork suggests that highest-potential land is typically selected (Cioﬀo, Ansoms, and
Murison 2016). Government publications link land consolidation with increased agricul-
tural production. Nevertheless, independent ﬁeld research shows mixed results. While in
one study almost 70% of farmers reported increased yields associated with CIP (and 18.5%
experienced lower yields) (University of Rwanda 2014), other research found a potential
link between land consolidation and food insecurity (Cioﬀo, Ansoms, and Murison 2016),
or suggested that it may beneﬁt wealthier households while disadvantaging poorer families
(Clay 2017; Dawson, Martin, and Sikor 2016). Dawson, Martin, and Sikor (2016) found,
for instance, that some of those smallholders unable to fully adopt the CIP practices con-
tinued to grow prohibited crops in hidden ways, or sold their land, as they feared ﬁnes,
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crop destruction or ultimately expropriation and reallocation without compensation. This
fear was not exaggerated given that in the previous decade 10% of 165 households in
Dawson, Martin and Sikor’s 2016 study had experienced expropriation of land without
compensation. Those selling land were typically the poorest households lacking disposable
income.
The second aspect of the CIP policy concentrates on delivering agricultural inputs to
smallholders, notably government-approved seeds and subsidised fertilisers. Fertilisers
were initially subsidised at a rate of 50% by the government, and were available on
credit (Chemouni 2014; Ansoms and Murison, ﬁeld research notes 2011). In Musanze
District, Cioﬀo, Ansoms, and Murison (2016) found that fertilisers were only oﬃcially
available to farmers cultivating a minimum of one hectare of land, which is above the
average land holding in Rwanda. Moreover, they are intended to only be used for the pro-
duction of crops approved by the CIP. Paying retrospectively for fertiliser proves proble-
matic when crop yields are low, or destroyed through disease (Ansoms and Murison, ﬁeld
research notes 2011). In recent years, the government has reformed the fertiliser distri-
bution system due to corruption among agro-dealers (Afadhali 2016; Ntirenganya
2016) and subsidies are only available to farmers who register for the agricultural exten-
sion services (MINALOC/MINAGRI 2016). Under this system, ‘farmer promoters’ receive
ﬁnancial bonuses based on seed and fertiliser sales in the village (MINALOC/MINAGRI
2016). However, such incentive-based systems have been linked with coercion in fertiliser
sales in some cases (Huggins 2014a). While seeds are sometimes provided free of charge
when fertiliser is purchased, farmers are often asked to purchase hybrid seeds at commer-
cial prices, which can be very high compared to other varieties. Non-governmental organ-
isations (NGOs) working with the government, such as One Acre Fund, charge high
interest rates for inputs provided on credit, making them unaﬀordable for many (Clay
2017). The situation is particularly problematic for poor households who are obliged to
plant priority crops (which require high levels of inputs, especially fertiliser) but are
unable to aﬀord those inputs, and hence risk crop failure (Dawson, Martin and Sikor
2016). By restricting crop types, the CIP has limited households’ abilities to produce
organic manure as an alternative – notably through the reduction of available (beer)
banana trees (Cioﬀo, Ansoms, and Murison 2016; Van Damme, Ansoms and Baret
2013). Seeds and other inputs are not always available at the correct times, impacting
yields (Huggins 2014a; Clay 2017). More generally, an insistence on the use of hybrid
seeds is eroding local agro-diversity, which has historically been supported by the informal
exchange of seed between farmers.
The third key element is agricultural extension, which has ‘advisory’, ‘monitoring’ and
‘enforcement’ functions. Agronomists, in conjunction with local authorities, ensure that
fertiliser is used only on government-approved crops, oversee land use consolidation,
and often focus on government-approved crops to the exclusion of others (Huggins
2014b). Various punishments have been used against farmers failing to follow the CIP,
including ﬁnes, destruction of crops, and sometimes even detention (Cioﬀo, Ansoms,
and Murison 2016; Huggins 2014a; Ansoms 2009). Because the activities of agronomists,
particularly government staﬀ, but also private and NGO personnel, are generally guided by
targets in District Development Plans and local imihigo performance contracts, pro-
gramme implementers tend to overlook ‘local repositories of tacit or vernacular knowl-
edge’ (Ansoms 2009, 289) regarding past histories with diﬀerent crops, soil
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characteristics and the climate, which have important consequences for overall pro-
duction. More generally, farmers’ organisations, which often receive funding for providing
training for cooperatives in CIP approaches, have often chosen to keep quiet about
farmer’s complaints about the CIP. This reduces their credibility and eﬀectiveness as advo-
cacy organisations (Huggins 2017b; see also ‘The role of civil society organisations in
modern agriculture’ section below).
The fourth angle of the CIP policy is post-harvest storage and the sale of crops. This has
involved the construction of useful infrastructures and new warrantage schemes (IFDC
2012). Marketing is largely managed through cooperatives. However, local authorities
have been involved in facilitating contacts with buyers and negotiating prices. In some
cases, cooperative leaders were essentially appointed by local authorities, and cooperative
governance may be opaque (Huggins 2014a; Ansoms and Murison 2012; see also ‘Coop-
eratives’ section below). Smallholders are often obliged to market all their CIP crops
through the cooperatives (and are often unable to reserve some for home consumption),
making the process vulnerable to various forms of corruption and elite capture of the pro-
ceeds (as described in more detail below). In quite some cases, prices oﬀered by the coop-
eratives to farmers are below market price (Ansoms et al. 2014).
The CIP can be seen as a process of simplifying agricultural systems (as well as making
them more input-oriented). This has frequently proved counter-productive in terms of
ensuring long-term sustainability of agro-ecological systems, as the human, climatic and
agro-ecological context has in many areas proven to be too complex and variable for
the sustained success of such a simple and rigid model.
Cooperatives
Following the 2006 Policy on the Promotion of Cooperatives (GoR 2006) and the sub-
sequent cooperative law in 2007 (GoR 2007), the Rwandan government launched a
revival of the country’s cooperative ‘movement’. This led to an increase of registered agri-
cultural cooperatives from 645 in 2008, to 2033 in 2015 (Verhofstadt and Maertens 2014,
4; Rwanda Cooperative Agency 2015). Some emerged from local farmer initiatives (Treidl,
ﬁeld research notes 2015), while others were established by local authorities within the fra-
mework of imihigo contracts (Huggins 2017b) or encouraged by NGOs, state-led develop-
ment, or investment programmes. In some cases, policy entrepreneurs took advantage of
the new policy to take a lead in the cooperative movement, and to appropriate power over
land and people (Huggins 2017b; Nyenyezi Bisoka 2016; Ansoms and Murison 2012).
Voluntary and open membership in a cooperative is listed as a ﬁrst guiding principle in
the cooperative law (GoR 2007, 3). However, farmers often lack attractive alternatives to
freely choose whether they really want to participate in a cooperative. If their plots are situ-
ated within the area of consolidation, farmers may be compelled to cooperate because they
may lose their land rights if they do not opt in (Huggins 2017b, see also Van Damme
2013). This situation is exacerbated in the state-owned marshlands. Since the rights to
use to the marshlands are no longer given to individuals, farmers are obliged to group
together and form cooperatives. In several cases this has led to the formation of ‘fake’
cooperatives either with the farmers’ primary intent to maintain the use-rights to ‘their’
formerly cultivated plots (Treidl, ﬁeld research notes 2016; Ansoms and Murison 2012),
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or to the appropriation of valuable marshlands and labour force by elites for their personal
proﬁt.
The opportunity to enter a cooperative depends on a farmer’s ﬁnancial situation (e.g.
the ability to pay the cooperative entry fees or membership contributions) (Treidl 2018;
Huggins 2013; Ansoms et al. 2014). It was observed that cooperative membership was
more feasible for wealthier farmers rather than poor or landless farmers (Dawson,
Martin and Sikor 2016; Treidl, ﬁeld diary 2015). Furthermore, becoming a cooperative
member also depends upon a farmer’s personal network, level of education, access to
information (e.g. about constitutive meetings) and labour capacity (Ansoms et al. 2014;
Verhofstadt and Maertens 2014).
Upon becoming a cooperative member, farmers face diﬀerent constraints during agri-
cultural production (Van Damme 2013). The cooperative’s liability for state regulations
such as the CIP or the land consolidation, as well as the increased level of ‘supervision’
by local and state authorities to engage in modern farming, comes with a loss of autonomy
(Cioﬀo, Ansoms, and Murison 2016; Huggins 2014a). Farmers need to adjust their daily
routines and responsibilities to the new and often inﬂexible cropping regime which tends
to disregard the heterogeneous living situations of the cooperative members (Treidl 2018).
This large-scale production scheme puts a lot of pressure on farmers, especially on poor
households with limited ﬁnancial, labour and time capacity, such as female-headed house-
holds (Verhofstadt and Maertens 2014). Furthermore, there are climate-change related
pressures aﬀecting cooperatives, particularly those focusing on crops that are not necess-
arily well adapted to local weather conditions (see e.g. Watkiss 2015 on the tea and coﬀee
sectors, and Huggins 2017b for maize cooperatives in Eastern Province).
One of the government’s objectives for the cooperative system was to enable farmers to
beneﬁt from the economies of scale eﬀects in collective, more eﬃcient, production
schemes (GoR 2006, 1, 22). According to the Ministry of Agriculture, cooperatives play
a key role in increasing agricultural output through modernised production and facilitat-
ing commercialisation. They have helped farmers to access information and loans (GoR
and MINAGRI 2013). However, even if higher yields were obtained, cooperative member-
ship did not always translate into higher proﬁts for all cooperative members. In several
cases, the costs of commercial inputs or the repayment of loans counterbalanced the
better yields (Treidl, ﬁeld research notes 2015; Huggins 2017b; Ansoms and Murison
2012). Missing payments and opaque cooperative management practices have also been
identiﬁed as reasons why farmers have not always beneﬁted from increased production
(Huggins 2017b). At the time of harvestings, and with large quantities of the crop being
harvested, the market price inevitably drops. To counter this, some cooperative leaders
kept the crop stored until the price increased. Subsequently, it took a longer time for
members to get their money – a problem exacerbated by the fact that the members
were not allowed to take a portion of the harvest home for household consumption
(Ansoms and Murison, ﬁeld research notes 2011; Ansoms and Murison 2012). The
expected higher productivity of cooperatives is also questionable in cases where the collab-
oration between investors or the government and the cooperative has failed. In such cases,
valuable farmlands regularly lie idle for several seasons because the rights to use them are
not suﬃciently clariﬁed (Ansoms 2013; Huggins 2017b; Treidl, ﬁeld diary 2016). Farmers
who are forced to join cooperatives that do not provide economic beneﬁts to members
may privately voice considerable frustration against the policy and the local and national
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authorities that enforce it (Huggins 2017b, Ansoms and Murison, ﬁeld research notes
2011).
To summarise, the Rwandan cooperative movement can refer to a solid law and
thoughtful policy. Yet, at the level of implementation, several gaps facilitate the structural
exclusion of poorer socio-economic groups and more vulnerable farmers. This will con-
tinue as long as the heterogeneous socio-economic background of farmers is not taken
into account. Top-down approaches tend to lead to a ﬁnancial burden, to production
schemes, and to opaque management structures which undermine the cooperative’s
claim for inclusiveness, as outlined in the National Cooperative Policy (GoR 2006).
The role of key actors in the agrarian modernisation policies
The Rwandan government’s Vision 2020 document has deﬁned the key policy objectives
for the 2000–2020 period. It includes speciﬁc agricultural targets, such as putting 50% of
all agricultural land under ‘modernised’ agriculture by 2020 and increasing average ferti-
liser use to 15 kg/ha/annum (MINECOFIN 2000). These objectives were subsequently
translated into national policies and decentralised development programmes at the district
and lower level. An eﬀectively organised and strictly coordinated top-down administrative
chain (Ingelaere 2007) renders local authorities responsible for reaching policy objectives
(see ‘The role of local authorities in modern agriculture’ section). Both governmental
agencies and civil society organisations (see ‘The role of civil society organisations in
modern agriculture’ section) are pushed into a target-driven approach to help meet objec-
tives laid out in local imihigo contracts.
The role of local authorities in modern agriculture
The strength and the reach of the Rwandan state under the Rwandan government have
been analysed through diﬀerent lenses, using diﬀerent sets of state programmes and inter-
ventions as proxies for the demonstration of the ability of the state to extend its reach on
the ‘thousand hills’ (Burnet 2008; Nyenyezi Bisoka 2016). For example, in a study of unity
and reconciliation policies, Purdeková (2011) showed how the Rwandan state is character-
ised by a high level of ‘presence’ and a tightly controlled environment populated by local
authorities accountable towards the centre.
The ability to mobilise the country’s resources and population for the aim of economic
development, is also evident in the Rwandan government’s agricultural and land policy
documents, as well as in the elaboration of diﬀerent sorts of policies and their implemen-
tation on the ground. The governing of the country’s (mostly rural) population serves the
aim of transforming Rwanda ‘into a target-driven society from the highest to the lowest
level’ (Ansoms 2011b, 240). This goal is accomplished through a tightly controlled
system of decentralised administration, organised from the top to the bottom in provinces,
districts, sectors, cells and, ﬁnally, imidugudu. The imihigo performance contracts at each
level ensure that the setting of policy targets resides with the political centre, giving rise to a
‘de-politicized but technocratic local elite’ (Chemouni 2014, 253).
At the same time, however, we see that local authorities can inﬂuence the implemen-
tation of nationally deﬁned policy objectives. There is elite capture of opportunities pro-
vided by the reconﬁguration of land and production processes, either by formal
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authorities, or by other inﬂuential actors. Ansoms and Murison (2012) have extensively
documented how in the initial stages of the marshland land rights reconﬁguration,
certain elites were capable of claiming land rights through the instrumentalisation of
associative and cooperative structures. Huggins (2017b) identiﬁes a similar dynamic in
a cooperative in Musanze District, Northern Province; and documents how administrators
and cooperative leaders have been involved in black-market sales of subsidised fertiliser,
intended for maize production, in Kirehe District, Eastern Province.
However, local authorities also use their margin for manoeuvre to respond to locally
formulated claims and complaints about certain policy aspects to adapt policy measures
to local conditions. For example, Cioﬀo (ﬁeld notes 2014; see also Ansoms and Cioﬀo
2016) documented that local authorities were increasingly ﬂexible with regards to
farmers’ demands to produce sorghum next to or instead of the imposed maize crop
type. The same goes for beans, as Van Damme observed tolerance from local authorities
to allow beans to be planted with banana, as a main source of protein for the rural popu-
lation in Eastern Province (Van Damme, Ansoms, and Baret 2013, see also Huggins
2017b). Local authorities are indeed often aware of the diﬃculties producers face when
having to adapt to the new agricultural model. There are two main reasons why such dis-
cussions seldom reach higher up to the Ministry of Agriculture. First, the imihigo perform-
ance contracts linked to the programme push authorities to report favourably on
programme activities. Second, local authorities are aware of the importance of positive
results for the Rwandan government who considers every concession to previous agricul-
tural practices as an obstacle to the reduction of rural poverty. Therefore, local authorities
rarely provide ‘bad news’ on policy implementation to higher-level authorities (Sommers
2012), and this ‘limits the possibilities for error correction and policy learning’ (Mann and
Berry 2016, 139). As the anthropology of public space in Africa has shown over the past 10
years, there is at times a developmental value to the transgression of formal rules (Olivier
de Sardan 2008). In other words, local arrangements that transgress formal rules may
provide important information on how to adapt policy interventions both at the global
and sectorial level. However, the rigid top-down character of the Rwandan governance
system oﬀers very limited space to draw lessons from policy transgression on the ground.
The role of civil society organisations in modern agriculture: ‘service delivery’
versus ‘advocacy’
The involvement of civil society in the Rwandan agricultural reform is limited to its
implementation, and, to a lesser extent, its monitoring. Among the civil society organis-
ations involved in the process, from the bottom to the top, we ﬁnd cooperatives, agricul-
tural organisations and unions, as well as organisations that provide technical support.
Civil society participation in the implementation of agricultural policy unfolds within
the framework of decentralisation and local governance, as outlined in the Vision 2020
and the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS). Such insti-
tutional frameworks call for the participation of the local population in the planning,
implementation and monitoring of development plans. Participation aims at strengthen-
ing the accountability of local authorities towards the population, and at improving the
performance of decentralised structures in reaching the objectives set out in the develop-
ment plan as well as in the yearly plans. State and civil society meet at Joint Action Forum
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(JAF), where development plans are harmonised and priorities, and expected results are
integrated into the imihigo performance contracts (Ansoms and Nyenyezi Bisoka, ﬁeld
research notes 2015–2017).
However, three important factors prevent civil society from making a substantial con-
tribution to the elaboration of the national agricultural strategy. First, the Green Revolu-
tion orientation of the agricultural strategy was never up for debate with civil society
organisations. Rather, it is inserted within a wider strategy adopted by the African
Union and the Rwandan Ministry of Agriculture. Second, the structures and organisations
that should mediate and facilitate the participation of local society in policy-making – such
as the JAF meetings – were put in place only after the policy was adopted (Panait and
Nyenyezi Bisoka 2014). Finally, and most importantly, civil society organisations are con-
sidered by the government as ‘service providers’ who are – just like local authorities – to be
held accountable on the basis of quantiﬁable objectives set by the imihigo performance
contracts. This calls into question the right of civil society organisations to function inde-
pendently from the government agenda, and downgrades their legitimacy to function as a
watchdog.
Nevertheless, despite the limited space for advocacy, ﬁeld data from the ground
(in-depth interviews, focus groups and participative theatre) show that civil society
organisations do successfully advocate for amendments to the often rigid rules of the
CIP policy at the local level. For instance, in diﬀerent locations, as a result of civil
society advocacy, local authorities allowed farmers to grow crops other than the ones tar-
geted through the CIP (Huggins 2017b; Van Damme, Ansoms, and Baret 2013, c). Simi-
larly, at times farmers could keep part of the production for household consumption that
would normally be destined for the cooperative. Furthermore, there are numerous
examples of authorities allowing farmers to choose the fertiliser, the tracing of hedgerows,
or the planting of trees in consolidated plots in case of degradation or erosion. Finally, in
diﬀerent districts changes have been made to the pricing mechanisms of crops after civil
society organisations exposed how local authorities were abusing their power position
to force unfavourable prices on producers (especially in rice and maize value chains)
(Nyenyezi Bisoka 2016).
Nevertheless, the capacity of civil society organisations to bear weight on higher-level
policy objectives remains limited. Criticism on local ‘deﬁciencies’ is tolerated – and in
quite some cases even welcomed – but only to the extent that it does not call into question
the overall Green Revolution rationale of the agrarian modernisation policy. In a way, the
advocacy role of civil society tolerated by the Rwandan government is limited to criticising
‘accidental’ ﬂaws in the system, but not to draw attention to systemic ﬂaws inherent to the
implementation of an agrarian model that clashes with the rationale of the large majority
of smallholder farmers.
Conclusion and reﬂection on reconﬁguration of social and political
ecologies
The agricultural and land sector modernisation should be viewed as a neoliberal develop-
ment project that intends to co-opt farmers into a state-managed system of commerciali-
sation and to render them more dependent on state services as well as private ﬁrms and
banks providing hybrid seeds, fertilisers, and credit. Through this dependency, the state
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actively enforces and consolidates its power. The words below from a farmer from
Southern Rwanda clearly point this out:
We have less and less land, and we need more and more money [… ]. We also have many
other obligations that enter into the framework of the performance contracts, commitments
that we make towards the local authorities. Our agriculture has to produce money to cover all
these expenses. [… ] At this point, we would like the state to give us a greater margin of
freedom in our activities. We know we have to evolve and to set aside traditional agriculture.
It [traditional agriculture] is no longer adapted to Rwanda but also to a world that opens up
and needs money. [… ] They should leave us more choice to cultivate what we think is proﬁ-
table. We are after all cultivateurs – commerçants; little agronomic enterprises, as agrono-
mists would say. (Farmer, June 2016)
This article has tried to add a layer of complexity to the assessment of the Rwandan agri-
cultural modernisation effort. This brings us to three important insights that extend
beyond the Rwandan case.
First, relying on household-level survey data as the only legitimate source of infor-
mation on poverty reduction and social development is a risky approach. Empirical evi-
dence derived from both statistical analysis and micro-level qualitative research
problematises the overreliance of state-generated national-level statistical analysis. Not
only does this information source risk being misleading in case of shaky methodologies,
but it is inherently designed to overlook and simplify the complex details of social
reality (Dawson 2015). Aggregation of household-level data adds an additional process
of simpliﬁcation. In particular, diﬀerentiated impacts of agricultural policies – dependent
upon geographical, topographical, and socio-economic varieties – are not readily ident-
iﬁed in aggregated statistics. Figures are not sensitive to people’s lived experiences, and
particularly to those of vulnerable groups (poor people, women, and historically margin-
alised people). In the case of Rwanda’s land and agrarian policies, broad-scale, aggregate
evaluation metrics used to claim policy success contrast markedly with local experiences
due to their oversight of negative impacts on many, particularly the poorest rural inhabi-
tants, through diminished land-tenure security, disrupted subsistence production, tra-
ditional farming methods and associated social practices.
Second, national-level statistics are instrumentalised by governance structures.
Through the process of codifying they ‘do not merely describe, observe, and map; they
strive to shape a people and landscape that will ﬁt their techniques of observation’
(Scott 1998, 82). This is what Scott calls a panoptical view: one that is placed at the
centre and relies on the (complex) simpliﬁcation of society as a collection of identiﬁable
and classable units ‘with registered, unique names and addresses keyed to grid settlements;
who pursue single, identiﬁable occupations; and all of whose transactions are documented
according to the designated formula and in the oﬃcial language’ (82). The creation of stat-
istical information is not only a descriptive activity, but a highly normative one: it narrates
reality, and in doing so, it shapes it in conformance with the vision held by the central
observer.
Third, this panoptical view is, because of its central and typifying nature, blind to
dynamics that do not ﬁt into expected patterns of behaviour, economic activity or inter-
ests. In other words: ‘there are virtually no other facts for the state than those that are con-
tained in documents standardized for that purpose’ (Scott 1998, 84). This risks creating
vicious cycles in which the evaluation and reformulation of state policy do not beneﬁt
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from grassroots feedback. Such a top-down approach in Rwandan policy-making means
that they rarely reach out to people at a local level. While those in favour of Rwanda’s
developmental model argue that ‘Rwandan policies have been changing in the face of
failure and are therefore not the result of a ﬁxed ideological position’ (Booth 2015,
S186) this ignores the political economy of policy-making. The question of whether house-
holds join cooperatives, purchase inputs and plant government-approved crops willingly,
or under duress, is crucial to understanding the long-term sustainability of the agricultural
reform as well as its impacts on the political climate of the country.
In short, while the agricultural modernisation programme in Rwanda has undoubtedly
produced some of the desired results (increased economic growth, increased agricultural
production output), the extent to which it has beneﬁted vulnerable population groups – a
large majority of the Rwandan population, such as poor smallholders, female-headed
households, single mothers and other marginalised groups – must be called into question.
National-level aggregated statistics portray only a part of the picture but cannot account
for the many cases of local failures, amendments and contestations. To eﬀectively engage
citizens and local society in the policy-planning process, a more nuanced and multi-
faceted approach is needed. This includes independent research, monitoring and evalu-
ation that complement standardised measures of representation with an in-depth, quali-
tative and realistic assessment of rural Rwandans needs and challenges.
Notes
1. The authors cited here are the authors of the article.
2. Imihigo performance contracts set speciﬁc levels of government objectives to be reached
within all levels of the administration. Examples include targets on the amount of maize
that a given sector should be growing or the number of households that should sign up
for public mutual health insurance. Imihigo are signed yearly, ensuring that ‘local authorities
are held accountable to their targets’ (Biedermann 2015, 15). They are not restricted to gov-
ernment administrative levels, but are also signed at the household level.
3. This attention to national-level statistics, and to the detailed planning of state intervention
and social life is not unique or new, but it is one of the deﬁning features of modern states.
This is clearly described by anthropologist James Scott who writes that, thanks to the
science of statistics for the ﬁrst time: ‘[S]ociety became an object that the state might
manage and transform with a view toward perfecting it. [… ] It was possible to conceive
of an artiﬁcial, engineered society designed, not by custom and historical accident, but
according to conscious, rational, scientiﬁc criteria. [… ] The working poor were often the
ﬁrst subjects of scientiﬁc social planning’ (Scott 1998, 96).
4. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY?locations=RW&view=chart.
5. Various authors of this article have had this experience when engaging in policy discussions
with both Rwandan and policy-makers and international actors inﬂuencing policy-making in
Rwanda.
6. There are other models for land consolidation as laid out in MINAGRI (2011) but those
described above are the most commonly found in practice.
7. There are 416 sectors in Rwanda, which has a total land area of 26,798 km².
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